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Abstract
This paper develops a new theoretical model with an asymmetric informal one-sided exchange rate target zone, with an
application to the Swiss franc following the removal of the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro in January
2015. We extend and generalize the standard target zone model of Krugman (1991) by introducing perceived
uncertainty about the lower edge of the band. We find that informal soft edge target zone bands lead to weaker
honeymoon effects, wider target zone ranges and higher exchange rate volatility than formal target zone bands. These
results suggest that it would be beneficial for exchange rate policy intentions to be stated clearly in order to anchor
exchange rate expectations and reduce exchange rate volatility. We also study how exchange rate dynamics can be
characterized in models in which financial markets are aware of occasional changes in the policy regime. We show that
expected changes in the central bank’s exchange rate policy may lead to exchange rate oscillations, providing an
additional source of exchange rate volatility, and to capture this it is important to take into account the possibility of
regime changes in exchange rate policy.
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JEL-Classification : F31, E42, C61
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1. Introduction
Since the outbreak of the euro area crisis, Swiss exchange rate policy has been a hotly debated topic. From September
2011 to January 2015 the official exchange rate policy of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) was to maintain a minimum
exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. To achieve this objective, the central bank stated that it would be willing to buy
foreign currency in unlimited quantities. On 15 January 2015, the SNB took markets by surprise with its decision to
discontinue Switzerland’s currency floor (SNB, 2015; Jerman, 2016).
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Countering an appreciating currency ought to be easier than countering a depreciating currency. A central bank trying
to prop up the exchange rate can run out of foreign exchange reserves. A central bank aiming for depreciation can
credibly promise to buy as much foreign currency as it takes, since it can print its owncurrency in unlimited amounts.
By discontinuing the so-called “minimum exchange rate” in January 2015, the SNB showed that a theoretically
unlimited strategy to defend a currency floor may have practical bounds. In particular, there may be an upper limit to
how far a central bank balance sheet can grow, including due to concerns about potential future losses on foreign
exchange reserves, as suggested for example by Amador, Bianchi, Bocola, and Perri (2016). Amador et al. (2016)
provide a theoretical model in which a central bank wants to maintain an exchange rate peg, and responds to increases
in demand for domestic currency by expanding its balance sheet. They model so-called ‘reverse speculative attacks’
triggered by the concern of future balance sheet losses of the central bank. They find that the interaction between the
desire to maintain an exchange rate peg and the concern about future balance sheet losses can lead the central bank to
first accumulate a large amount of reserves, and then to abandon the peg, and conclude that this was just as had been
observed in the Swiss case. The fact that a Swiss referendum was held on 30 November 2014 over the proposition that
the SNB should hold at least 20% of its reserves in gold (The Economist, 2014), suggests that there was some political
pressure to limit losses on the central bank’s balance sheet, even though the referendum was defeated. Thus there may
be a limit to conducting central bank policy by steering the exchange rate. As a consequence, the SNB resorted, like
many other central banks, to cutting interest rates with all the risks of feeding market distortions that such a policy may
entail (see Bank for International Settlements, 2010).
The model presented in this paper applies to the situation where there is no formal one-sided target zone for the
currency, but where there are market perceptions of an informal one-sided target zone. This may have been the case
following the discontinuation of the SNB’s currency floor in January 2015, since proxy measures for the SNB’s foreign
exchange interventions presented below suggest that the SNB likely continued to intervene in the foreign exchange
market.
In light of the fact that exchange rate regimes have been at the centre of academic debate and have been a major
concern for policymakers in recent years, this paper develops a new theoretical model with an asymmetric informal
(unofficial, not publicly announced) one-sided target zone. Such a model incorporates the notion that the target zone
can be seen as a partially credible commitment device. It can be regarded as a generalisation of Krugman’s (1991)
simple target zone model of exchange rates. In the standard model, the peg and the hard edge boundaries are publicly
announced and credible, and market arbitrage mechanisms and interventions take place in whatever amounts are
necessary to prevent the target zone from being violated. Our paper is not a normative analysis of the best exchange
rate policy or exchange rate target, especially given uncertainty about fundamental drivers of exchange rates.
We find that informal soft edge target zone bands lead to weaker honeymoon effects, wider target zone ranges and
higher exchange rate volatility than formal target zone bands. The honeymoon effect stabilises the exchange rate
relative to its fundamentals. It refers to the phenomenon that, if the Swiss franc is close to the informal floor, the
probability increases that the Swiss franc will hit the floor, which leads to perceived interventions by the central bank.
These results suggest that it would be beneficial for exchange rate policy intentionsto be stated clearly in order to
anchor exchange rate expectations and reduce exchange rate volatility. We also study how exchange rate dynamics can
be characterized in models in which financial markets are aware of occasional changes in the policy regime. We show
that expected changes in the central bank’s exchange rate policy may in addition be a source of exchange rate
oscillations, providing an additional source of exchange rate volatility, and to capture this it is important to take into
account the possibility of regime changes in exchange rate policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the evolution of the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate, and Section 3
presents proxy measures for the SNB’s foreign exchange interventions as a function of the EUR/CHF exchange rate, at
both a weekly and monthly frequency. Section 4 presents the model and its solution using Switzerland as a motivating
example. Analytically, the modelling approach lies at the crossroads of the literature on exchange rate target zones
originated by Krugman (1991) and the literature on intervention in the foreign exchange market. With the aim of
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parsimony in mind, but also wanting to ensure a fair degree of reality, we extend and generalize the standard target
zone model by introducing perceived uncertainty about the lower edge, as following the policy change in January
2015. Section 5 concludes, draws some policy implications and hints at future research.
2. Swiss franc-euro exchange rate and currency floor
Within minutes of the announcement to discontinue the minimum exchange rate on 15 January 2015, the Swiss franc
rose by 40 percent against the euro (see Figure 1). Following the announcement, the Swiss franc even reached parity
against the euro.
[1]
 Following this initial overshooting, the Swiss franc subsequently depreciated from this low level.
The model of this paper for an informal one-sided target zone for the Swiss franc presented in Section 4 applies to this
latter period, after the initial overshooting. That is, our model applies to a situation where there was no longer a formal
one-sided target zone, but when there may have been market perceptions of an informal, not publicly announced, one-
sided target zone, since the SNB likely continued to intervene in the foreign exchange market, as suggested by the
proxy measures for the SNB’s foreign exchange interventions presented in Section 3.
[2]
 
The currency floor had been introduced in 2011 to halt the appreciation of the Swiss franc, and it protected the
country’s many exporters.
[3]
 It had been effective in preventing an even larger erosion of the competitive position of
Swiss exporters. According to the SNB’s assessment on 15 January 2015, “The minimum exchange rate was
introduced during a period of exceptional overvaluation of the Swiss franc and an extremely high level of uncertainty
on the financial markets. This exceptional and temporary measure protected the Swiss economy from serious harm.
While the Swiss franc is still high, the overvaluation has decreased as a whole since the introduction of the minimum
exchange rate. The economy was able to take advantage of this phase to adjust to the new situation” (SNB, 2015).
Streit (2016) finds evidence for Swiss non-financial firms of significant reductions in total stock return volatility as
well as market risk following the introduction of the currency floor. In order to counter the appreciation of the Swiss
franc, the SNB also announced on 18 December 2014 that it would introduce a negative interest rate of –0.25% on
sight deposit account balances at the SNB starting on 22 January 2015, which was reduced further to –0.75% on 15
January 2015, in order to “ensure that the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate does not lead to an
inappropriate tightening of monetary conditions” (SNB, 2015).
[Figure 1 about here]
3. SNB Foreign Exchange Interventions
The model presented in Section 4 applies to the situation where there is no formal one-sided target zone for the Swiss
franc, but where there are market perceptions of an informal, not publicly announced, one-sided target zone. This may
have been the case following the discontinuation of the SNB’s currency floor in January 2015, since proxy measures
for the SNB’s foreign exchange interventions presented in this Section suggest that the SNB likely continued to
intervene in the foreign exchange market.
Between the dates of the introduction of the CHF 1.20 per euro floor and its discontinuation, the SNB’s foreign
currency reserves increased significantly. At the end of December 2014 they reached CHF 495 billion or almost 80
percent of Swiss GDP – up from CHF 254 billion or almost 45 percent of Swiss GDP at the end of 2011. And with the
ECB´s quantitative easing programme, the required amounts of foreign exchange intervention to maintain the floor
were about to become far higher, increasing the risk of larger losses on foreign exchange reserves in future. For
example, SNB governing board member Zurbrügg mentioned that maintaining the minimum exchange rate would have
required increasingly higher foreign exchange interventions: “According to SNB Governing Board member Fritz
Zurbrügg, the [Swiss] National Bank would have had to intervene with increasingly large amounts in the foreign
exchange market in order to maintain the minimum exchange rate. […] "Extrapolated to one month, we would have
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had to intervene with around 100 billion francs in January alone", Zurbrügg said in an interview last week […].”
Following the discontinuation of the CHF 1.20 per euro floor in January 2015, the SNB’s foreign exchange reserves
continued to increase.
In the announcement to discontinue the minimum exchange rate on 15 January 2015, the SNB mentioned that it will
“continue to take account of the exchange rate situation in formulating its monetary policy in future. If necessary, it
will therefore remain active in the foreign exchange market to influence monetary conditions” (SNB, 2015). Since then
the SNB has remained vague about exchange rate interventions ex-post, and generally does not confirm speculations
about interventions, with a few exceptions. The SNB also reduced the negative interest rate to –0.75% on 15 January
2015, in the words of former vice-chair Danthine, to “reinstate an interest rate differential with respect to the eurozone,
in particular, to limit the appreciation of the CHF that was viewed as the inevitable result of abandoning the floor”
(Danthine, 2016).
The most recent SNB interventions have mostly not been publicly announced by the SNB.
[4]
 Ahead of the Brexit
referendum, for instance, the SNB did not announce that it would intervene, but referred more generally to taking
measures if necessary: “As a small open economy Switzerland is strongly exposed to developments abroad. When the
United Kingdom votes next week on whether to remain in the European Union, it can lead to increased uncertainty and
turbulences. In this context we will monitor the situation closely and will take measures if needed.” (Jordan, 2016).
Following Brexit, the SNB publicly announced that it had intervened: “"Following the UnitedKingdom’s vote to leave
the European Union, the Swiss franc came under upward pressure," the central bank said via e-mail. "The Swiss
National Bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the situation and will remain active in that
market"” (Bloomberg, 2016). SNB president Jordan confirmed the intervention over the weekend following Brexit:
“"We have always said that we are active in the foreign exchange market if necessary," SNB Chairman Thomas Jordan
said at a finance event in Bern, Switzerland. "A situation like we experienced over the weekend is a situation which
warranted this need and we went in to stabilize the market."” (Reuters, 2016). Another exception was at the height of
the euro area sovereign debt crisis (Bloomberg, 2015, as cited below).
Some evidence suggests that foreign exchange intervention is often geared to limiting what policymakers may see as
unwarranted, and possibly harmful, deviations from equilibrium levels (Daude & Yeyati 2014; Bank for International
Settlements 2005, 2013).
[5]
 Daude, Yeyati, and  Nagengast (2014) present evidence for the prevalence of such
exchange rate intervention in emerging economies, and show that it mitigates real exchange rate volatility. An
overvalued exchange rate may be generated in the presence of safe haven effects arising in situations of pronounced
uncertainty and/or if the exchange rate overreacts to news. In this case, exchange rate intervention against the direction
that the exchange rate is moving may be a useful instrument to reduce the distortion.
The theoretical literature on optimal exchange rate interventions is enormous. For a seminal paper, see Boyer (1978).
Reeves (1997) constructed a game-theoretic framework with partial credibility and non-rational expectations to
examine the mode of action of the signalling channel. In this set-up exchange rate interventions represent signals of
future monetary policy and hence affect exchange rate expectations. Note that it is not at all clear that exchange rate
interventions will always be beneficial. In particular, the central bank may not know the true economic fundamentals
but face uncertainty and misperceptions about them. Moreover, the central bank may not be capable of correctly
identifying the equilibrium exchange rate implied by the fundamentals or, even if it would be able to do so, the costs of
the exchange rate interventions may be too high relative to the benefits. Furthermore, persistent changes in investor
preferences can have persistent effects on exchange rates.
Another argument supportive of a case for exchange rate interventions is that the authorities’ information set may be
superior to the information set of market participants. On this argument the central bank could make the intervention
data set publicly available, since this would eliminate the informational asymmetry.
[6]
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Archer (2005) argues thattransparent foreign exchange intervention is preferable to secret intervention because it
increases the power of the signalling and coordination channels, which increases the effectiveness of intervention. A
number of explanations have been put forward to explain why foreign exchange interventions may not be made public.
In a situation of high uncertainty and volatility of foreign exchange markets, it may be risky for a central bank to
announce publicly the intention of intervening, especially if the effectiveness may not be believed by market
participants (see Cukierman & Meltzer, 1986).
Transparency about foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate policy may have adverse effects, which need to
be weighed against the potential benefits of transparency about exchange rate policy and intervention implied by the
signalling channel. Possible adverse effects include increased pressure on the exchange rate from possible speculative
attacks, for which communication about foreign exchange intervention or exchange rate policy could function as a
coordination device, and increases in the size of speculative flows and in the costs of carrying reserves (Chutasripanich
& Yetman, 2015). Ambiguity about past and planned amounts of foreign exchange intervention and desired exchange
rates may help a central bank counter or prevent coordinated speculative attacks. This is in contrast to communication
about the monetary policy framework in the form of an inflation target, and in contrast to communication about the
policy rate (for surveys see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan, & Jansen, 2008, and Moessner, Jansen, & de Haan,
2017), where no such adverse effects from speculative attacks are present.
For example, in Mexico a transparent rule-based foreign exchange intervention mechanism introduced in December
2014 was discontinued in February 2016 because of pressures on the exchange rate, including due to apparent
speculation by foreign exchange traders against the rule-based mechanism, while the possibility of future discretionary
intervention was kept open (Domanski, Kohlscheen, & Moreno, 2016).
[7]
 Due to an increase of electronic trading
volumes (accounting for around two thirds of foreign cash market turnover in 2015, an increase from less than 50%
before the global financial crisis), the effects of foreign exchange intervention on the exchange rate may depend more
and more on the central bank’s ability to surprise markets (Domanski et al, 2016). Some papers find that central banks
use secret foreign exchange intervention to maximise the impact on the exchange rate (Dominguez & Frankel, 1993;
Neely, 2001; Sarno & Taylor, 2001).
Weekly FX intervention proxy
Sight deposits are currently the most important means of financing for SNB currency purchases. Thus changes in total
sight deposits in Swiss francs at the SNB are a proxy for the SNB’s FX interventions (Auer, 2015).
[8]
 But sight
deposits can also change for reasons other than interventions, for example due to flight-to-safety by banks, and they are
therefore only an imperfect proxy measure for foreign exchange interventions.
This proxy measure of changes in total sight deposits in Swiss francs at the SNB is available at weekly frequency from
the SNB, which is at higher frequency than the monthly foreign exchange reserves data, and therefore gives a more
time-exact picture of the associated exchange rate levels.
[9]
 Changes in total sight deposits in Swiss francs at the SNB,
from the week starting 19 January 2015, i.e. after removal of minimum exchange rate, to mid-July 2016, against
weekly averages of the EUR/CHF exchange rate, are shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
We can see strong evidence of intervention around parity of the euro against the CHF – total sight deposits in Swiss
franc at the SNB increased by CHF 26.2 billion in the week starting 19 January 2015. We can also see some evidence
of intervention at levels of the EUR/CHF exchange rate between around 1.03 and 1.11, with a possible concentration at
a level of around 1.08. This is close to the level of 1.07, which economists expected to be defended by the SNB, as
mentioned above (Neue Züricher Zeitung, 19 June 2016). The measure post-Brexit only, i.e. from the week starting 20
June 2016, is marked as filled triangles in Figure 2.
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Monthly FX intervention proxies
Another proxy measure for the SNB’s FX intervention is changes in foreign currency reserves. We use data on total
foreign currency reserves in convertible foreign currencies. A further proxy measure is changes in foreign currency
reserves adjusted for valuation changes.
[10]
 These two proxy measures are shown in Figure 3 against monthly
averages of the EUR/CHF exchange rate, and suggest that the SNB may have intervened at levels of the EUR/CHF
exchange rate of around 1.04 to 1.10. But foreign currency reserve changes may occur for reasons unrelated to central
bank intervention.
[11]
 Moreover, the valuation adjustment is imperfect. These two proxy measures are therefore only
imperfect measures. Furthermore, since these are monthly measures, we cannot relate them to the exact exchange rate
levels, but only to monthly averages.
Despite the drawbacks of the three proxy measures, all provide some indication of possible foreign exchange
intervention by the SNB for levels of the EUR/CHF exchange rate between around 1.04 and 1.10, which we use to
motivate the calibration of our informal edge target zone model presented in the next section. However, the evidence
from these three proxy measures is also consistent with the SNB having tried to prevent a CHF appreciation to varying
degrees at all exchange rate levels observed since 2015, rather than having a clear intervention threshold to enforce a
particular lower bound.
[Figure 3 about here]
4. An Informal Single-Edged Target Zone Model
The model presented in this Section applies to a situation where there is a formal one-sided target zonewhich is only
partially credible. It also applies to a situation where there are market perceptions of an informal, not publicly
announced, one-sided target zone, as may have been the case following the discontinuation of the SNB’s currency floor
in January 2015, as discussed in Section 3.
Our model can be regarded as a generalisation of Krugman´s (1991) simple target zone model of exchange rates. In the
standard model, the peg and the hard edge boundaries are publicly announced and credible, and market arbitrage
mechanisms and interventions take place in whatever amounts are necessary to prevent the band from being violated.
A number of papers have modified and relaxed the assumption of perfectly known bands. Klein (1992) and Chen,
Funke, and Glanemann (2013) have presented models in which the width of the band is unknown to the public. Thus,
the dynamics of the exchange rate is not only driven by fundamentals but also by expectations with respect to the
width of the band. In this context, interventions reveal the true edge of the band. This mechanism stresses the
information role of interventions.
In contrast, our model develops the notion that the exchange rate band can be seen as a partially credible commitment
device, within a new theoretical framework with an asymmetric informal one-sided target zone. Moreover, in the
absence of an announced target zone, a central bank’s policies, including foreign exchange interventions, may generate
perceptions in the market that there is an informal one-sided target zone. The contribution of the paper comprises
theoretical exchange rate modelling. We do not claim to have developed a way to model the day-to-day movements of
the EUR/CHF exchange rate since 15 January 2015.
Standard Krugman model
It is natural to consider the basic Krugman (1991) framework with a perfectly known and credible strong band as a
benchmark. The model is based on the flexible-price monetary model and thus purchasing power parity is assumed to
hold continuously. We do this, despite the fact that predictions derived from the standard Krugman model have not
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stood up well in empirical tests (see, for example, Svensson, 1992). We feel that this choice is justified, because our
main focus in this paper is on theoretical modelling issues. Moreover, Lera and Sornette (2016) find that during the
period when the SNB enforced the minimum exchange rate of 1.20 Swiss francs per euro, the EUR/CHF exchange rate
was well explained by Krugman's target zone model, but seemingly only under strong pressure pushing the exchange
rate close to the boundary of the target zone.
In the standard target zone framework, the dynamics of the exchange rate results from the intervention obligations.
This gives rise to areflected or regulated Brownian motion and the exchange rate exhibits mean reversion towards the
band.
[12]
 After 15 January 2015, market participants are likely to have formed expectations of the informal band based
on the actual exchange rate and suspected interventions. Thus, the log of the exchange rate  can be written as the sum
of the log of the fundamentals  and its expected change:
where  denotes the expectations operator for exchange rate changes with ,  and . Following
the usual assumption of the target zone framework, we assume that the log of the fundamentals follows a simple
Brownian motion without a drift,
where  represents the constant risk parameter of the log of the fundamentals and  denotes the standard Wiener
process.[13] Applying Itô’s lemma to the expectations term yields
it is obvious for a one-sided target zone with a credible lower band that the analytical solutions for the steady-state
observations for financial market participants are as follows,
where  is a positive parameter and . The meaning of equation (4) is straightforward. Without central
bank interventions, financial market participants would anticipate a one-to-one relationship between the exchange rate
and the fundamentals. In other words,  shows the unregulated exchange rate dynamics. The exponential term 
 causes the bending of the exchange rate function and thus generates the target zone nonlinearity. We need to
determine the parameter . The parameter  depends upon the lower band  and the associated fundamentals .
Employing the value-matching condition enables the determination ofthe constant  as
 .
The term smooth pasting denotes the phenomenon that the path of the exchange rate smoothes out on its way to  and
that its slope becomes zero when it actually hits .
[14]
 The smooth-pasting condition implies
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which gives us the constant  as
 .
The associated relationship for the fundamental value  and lower band  thus is
Equations (5) and (6) imply that the intervention-value parameter  is a function of  and hence a function of : 
 Rearranging and solving for  finally gives us the reduced form relationship between the exchange rate
and the fundamentals  driven by the lower band :
The linear part, , represents the solution for a free float. The nonlinear part, , is known as the honeymoon
effect and refers to the phenomenon that if the Swiss franc is close to the informal floor, the probability increases that
the Swiss franc will hit the floor, which leads to perceived interventions by the central bank. As a consequence, the
probability that the Swiss franc will depreciate is higher than the probability that it will appreciate further. From this it
follows that the Swiss franc will appreciate less than given by the fundamentals  alone. In other words, the
honeymoon effect stabilises the exchange rate relative to its fundamentals.
[15]
 Intuitively, equation (9) is characterized
by the following features:
i. For very small values of , such as the limiting case , the interventions go to zero as .
Thus, the exchange rate becomes almost free floating.
 ii. For a very small adjustment parameter or very small risk parameter in equations (2) and (3), i.e.  and/or 
, we have . This means that interventions are ineffective for  and unnecessary for .
iii. For  the intervention term disappears and the exchange rate is free floating as only a lower bound 
exists.
Normal distribution for 
In the original Krugman (1991) model, the reduced form relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals is
driven by the perfectly known and credible floor. Conversely, what happens when the relationship is driven not by the
floor itself but by expectations regarding the band? How can we model perceived uncertainty of market participants as
to  and the central bank’s determination to defend the informal floor?
To keep the model tractable, and consistent with the empirical evidence in Section 3, we assume that the interventions
have a normal distribution for , and equation (8), which shows a linear relationship between  and , also implies a
normal distribution for . In other words, we have  and . A complicating issue is that
foreign exchange market intervention can happen not only at the boundary of the target zone (marginal intervention),
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but also within the band (intramarginal intervention), which could reflect a policy of timely “leaning against the wind”.
With intramarginal interventions, the honeymoon effect will be smaller than in the standard target zone model. This is
due to the fact that the probability of the exchange rate hitting the boundaries is smaller if intramarginal interventions
are successful. Klein and Lewis (1993) have extended the model to the case of stochastic intra-marginal interventions.
Inthe current setup, the possibility of intramarginal interventions might be reflected in a smaller value of the
uncertainty parameter .
Market participants can only observe the interventions with a mean value  for exchange rates and observations have
a normal distribution around . It is obvious that  and . With the above distribution for , we
can analyse the response from financial market participants by taking expectations of value-matching condition
equation (5) conditional upon the observed normal distributions to determine how the uncertainty about the SNB’s
preferences and thus the informal band feeds back into the dynamics of the exchange rate. The exponential term 
 of equation (5) has the properties of . Therefore, equation (5) now becomes
The corresponding smooth-pasting condition around the observed  is denoted by
This yields
 .
Hence, the variable  is determined as
Substituting equation (13) back into equation (4) we finally get the law of motion of the exchange rate in the informal
band system
Compared with equation (9), the impact of interventions is reduced by the factor , which implies that higher
uncertainty about the intervention range leads to a smaller smile and thus a lower J-curve.
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Next we study the properties of this informal band model. The baseline parameters are , , 
, and .[16] Under the assumptions sketched out above, Figure 4 portrays the dynamics of the logged
exchange rate versus the logged fundamentals. The blue line always gives the exchange rate dynamics according to
equation (9). The pink lines are 45 percent degree lines representing the free-float solution. The horizontal dashed lines
represent . In order to cast light on perceived SNB policy uncertainty, various combinations of  
 are assumed in each of the four graphs. The details are as follows: upper left panel ; upper right panel: 
; lower left panel: ; lower right panel: .
[Figure 4 abouthere]
Several properties of the solution are apparent from Figure 4. First, as expected, the resulting dynamics of the
exchange rate is J-shaped even in the absence of a formal lower floor. Second, an important difference between the
solution for a fully credible formal lower floor and a perceived informal lower floor is that a unique exchange rate is
defined as a function of the fundamentals for the traditional (credible) one-sided target zone, while a family of such
curves is defined for the perceived informal one-sided target zone. Third, for perceived uncertainty about the informal
lower floor ( ), the resulting J-shaped curve is a monotonically increasing function of the level of  . Put the
other way round, the moderating effect is the stronger, the greater the credibility of the policymaker and the lower the
uncertainty about the lower band. Fourth, while all curves are almost identical near , the informal band
curves become steeper than the hard band curve as the exchange rate approaches the edges. Hence, informal soft edge
bands lead to weaker honeymoon effects, wider target zone ranges and higher exchange rate volatility.
Since the honeymoon effects become weaker as uncertainty about the informal lower band increases, as shown in
Figure 4, a policy conclusion from the numerical simulations is that central bank communication about exchange rate
policy would help to anchor exchange rate expectations and reduce exchange rate volatility. A central bank’s exchange
rate policy intentions regarding a lower band could be stated clearly to reduce misinterpretation. Furthermore,
misreading of a policy could be corrected in a timely manner. In line with this conclusion, Archer (2005) argues that
transparent FX intervention is preferable to secret intervention (see Section 3).
However, transparency about foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate policy may also have adverse effects,
which would need to be weighed against the potential benefits of transparency about exchange rate policy and
intervention implied by our model, including due to the effects of possible speculative attacks, which are not modelled
here (see the discussion in Section 3). Moreover, uncertainty and misperceptions about fundamentals, which are not
modelled here, could affect the desirability of transparency.
Markov switching framework
Next, we allow for exchange rate dynamics with discrete regime shifts. The pivotal requirement for the honeymoon
effect to function properly is that the public believes that the informal target zone will persist. So far a point estimate
for  augmented with a normal distribution has been assumed. Given that Markov-switching models have become a
popular tool to allow for parameter instability and parameter uncertainty, we go beyond the previous exercises and
pursue the analysis further by augmenting the framework with a bivariate Markov-switching model.
[17]
 In other
words, we characterize financial market’s uncertainty about the informal floor via the possibility of regime changes.
The main advantages of regime-switching models are that they (i) provide a high goodness of fit in face of policy
switches; (ii) can accommodate a wide variety of macroeconomic shocks and nonlinearities; (iii) can visualize the
impact of unobservable variables such as credibility of announcements or anticipation of forthcoming events; and (iv)
can take the prospect of policy shifts and exchange rate dynamics alternating between regimes changes into account.
How do we introduce such dynamics into the informal target zone model?
[18]
 To fix ideas, we assume that the
exchange rate dynamics is subject to discrete regime shifts governed by a two-regime Markov process with constant
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transition probabilities.
[19]
 Formally,  is the probability of state 1 jumping to state 0, and  is the probability of
state 1 remaining in the same state. Similarly,  denotes the probability of state 0 jumping to state 1, and  is for
state 0 remaining in the same state.
[20]
 Thus, the probability of shifting from state 0 to state 1 in an interval of time of
length  is , and the probability of switching from state 1 to state 0 is . Note that the jump probabilities need
not be identical because the central bank may have asymmetric preferences. A perfectly credible lower bound is
obtained by setting the switching probabilities to zero. Regime switches might occur in an attack-type crisis when the
Swiss franc suddenly comes under pressure or appreciates strongly in ways inconsistent with the present policy regime.
Therefore it is reasonable to assume  in the recurrent two-state process.
[21]
 In other words, we assume that the
exchange rate triggering interventions in state 0 is higher than in state 1. This assumption is made largely for
convenience.
In the following we analyse some of the channels through which cross-regime effects come about and assess their
policy relevance. In the following subsection we assume that market participants know the current state of the
exchange rate regime and are able to conjecture the switching probabilities. Under these two assumptions, the two
regimes can be characterised as follows:
where  ( ) is the expected lower band for state 0 (1). The above equations are obtained by taking the expected
value of the lower bands for state 0 and state 1, respectively. The next task is to solve for the Markov-switching
interventions.  The state-dependent law of motion of the exchange rate in the Markov switching version of the model is
given by
where  and  are the risk parameters for the fundamentals in state 0 and state 1, respectively. 
What is the implied momentum of this assumption? The existence of two states introduces a complication, in that the
exchange rate will jump to the new edge of the informal band as appropriate by means of an instantaneous discrete
intervention. There are two cases to be distinguished. When a policy change from state 0 to state 1 occurs, and the
actual exchange rate at this juncture satisfies the condition , then no interventions will take place. The reason is
that the central bank tolerates a further appreciation of the exchange rate beyond  up to . On the contrary, in the
case of a reverse jumpfrom state 1 to state 0, an actual exchange rate in the range  will trigger an
immediate intervention to sustain the new regime 0. This implies that over the range , we need to change
equation (18) as follows so as to satisfy the boundary conditions:
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In the next step, we modify the standard method for solving for the exchange rate in terms of the fundamentals, to
allow for there being two states of the world. There are two cases to be distinguished. In the first case the new regime
satisfies the range .
In the second case,  is valid. These two cases cover all the possibilities, and we consider them in
turn. As shown in Appendix A, the solution for  and  is as follows:
where , , and , , , and  are constants to be determined by the boundary
conditions. The analogous solution for the second case of  is provided in Appendix B.
The Markov-switching version of the model is characterised by the fundamentals  and  perceived by market
participants and the associated exchange rates  and . The expected values of the lower bands,  and , then
reflect the corresponding values of  and . The regime-dependent value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
at the Swiss franc’s floor are given by:
Numerical examples
In consideration of equations (23) and (24), we can numerically determine the fundamentals  and  at the
perceived regime-dependent intervention bands. After having obtained the values of , , and , we can use
numerical simulations to gain further insight into the regime-dependent exchange rate dynamics in the informal target
zone model with Markov-switching via equations (20) and (21), respectively. We use this exercise to have a feel for the
model and to draw a map of the exchange rate sensitivity to various structural characteristics of the Markov-switching
environment. We hope to show that the insights gained from simulations are sufficiently rich to indicate that it provides
a useful complement to theory. Adding this first-order Markov chain stochasticity into the model leads to the numerical
simulation results for the regime-dependent dynamics of the Swiss franc in Figures 5 and 6.
In Figure 5 we show numerical simulation results of how exchange rate dynamics can be characterized in models in
which financial markets are aware of occasional changes in the policy regime. Figure 5 shows representations of the J-
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shaped dynamics of the exchange rate for different values of  and  for given jump probabilities on a
case-by-case basis. Thus, the discontinuity is represented by a shift in the perceived mean. In the upper left (right)
graph a policy regime change from  to  ( ) is simulated. In the lower left graph 
 and  are simulated. In other words, this panel presents the case of a perceived switch back to
the regime prior to 15 January 2015. Finally, the lower right panel gives the dynamics of the exchange rate for the two
regimes  and .
[Figure 5 about here]
Four interesting results emerge. First, the exchange rate dynamics alternates between regimes (see the two J-curves in
each of the panels). Second, there is mutual interdependence of the J-curves across regimes. The mere fact that a
regime change might happen has effects even when no regime change has taken place. Third, despite this fact it is
notable that the lower floor remains a stabilizing instrument even under regime-switching expectations, as evidenced
by the J-shaped dynamics in each of the panels in Figure 5. Put differently, even in the presence of Markov-switching
and boundaries that are not publicly announced, the exchange rate is stabilized relative to the case of a free float.
Fourth, the story is more subtle than has been acknowledged so far. Figure 5 indicates that in the Markov-switching
version of the model the exchange rate will jump to a new J-curve as soon as the perceived lower floor has changed.
Put differently, rightly or wrongly expected changes in the central bank’s exchange rate policy cause shifts in the J-
curves and may lead to exchange rate oscillations. This additional source of volatility cannot be detected if uncertainty
is computed conditioning on a sole regime. Therefore, it is important to take into account the possibility of regime
changes.
[Figure 6 about here]
Next, we also present numerical simulation results which show that the contribution of the different regimes to the
overall volatility does not depend only on the size of the policy shocks, but also on the shocks’ frequency and
persistence. In Figure 6 we relax the assumption of given jump probabilities . To repeat,  denotes the
probability of state 0 jumping to state 1 and  is the probability of state 1 jumping to state 0. By contrast, 
 and   is assumed throughout. Under these assumptions, the four graphs summarize the model simulation
results for different jump probabilities  and . The comparison indicates how different jump probabilities change the
dynamics of the exchange rate.
Again three interesting results emerge. First, the jump probabilities and thus policy shifts play a big role, as can be seen
for example by comparing the J-curves for the jump probabilities of (0.1,0.1)in the top left panel with those for the
higher jump probabilities of (0.5,0.5) in the bottom right panel. Second, the comparison of the J-curves in the different
panels reveals that a less (more) likely regime change leads to smaller (larger) cross-impacts. As a result, the
importance of the regime that is in place at a particular point in time is substantially reduced when taking into account
the possibility of future regime changes. Thus, accounting for potential cross-regime effects appears to be an important
element of a good policy design. Based on this model with regime changes, effective central bank communication
about the target zone bands may be helpful in reducing exchange rate volatility from such cross-regime effects. Third,
occurrences which look like speculative attacks on the Swiss franc may be associated with market perceptions of a
policy regime switch having taken place.
[22]
The numerical results indicate that perceived possible regime switches and speculative attacks may put the central bank
under strain, even though it has not changed its foreign exchange market policies yet. Effective central bank
communication may be helpful in order to anchor exchange rate expectations and reduce exchange rate volatility.
This ability of the univariate Markov-switching model to generate non-trivial connections between the dynamics of the
exchange rate in both regimes represents a promising feature and opens the door to study the link between exchange
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rate uncertainty and real activity in a multivariate setting.
[23]
 This might be useful in future research in light of the
attention that uncertainty has recently received in the profession following the seminal contribution of Bloom (2009).
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper develops a new theoretical model with an asymmetric informal (unofficial) one-sided target zone, using
Switzerland as an example. The model incorporates the notion that a target zone can be seen as a partially credible
commitment device. Analytically, the modelling approach lies at the crossroads of the literature on exchange rate target
zones originated by Krugman (1991) and that on intervention in the foreign exchange market. With the aim of
parsimony in mind, but also with the aim of ensuring afair degree of reality, we extend and generalize the standard
target zone model by introducing perceived uncertainty about the lower band following the removal of the minimum
exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro in January 2015.
We find that informal soft edge target zone bands lead to weaker honeymoon effects, wider target zone ranges and
higher exchange rate volatility than formal target zone bands. As discussed in Section 3, the honeymoon effect
stabilises the exchange rate relative to its fundamentals. It refers to the phenomenon that, if the Swiss franc is close to
the informal floor, the probability increases that the Swiss franc will hit the floor, which leads to perceived
interventions by the central bank. Consequently, the probability that the Swiss franc will depreciate is higher than the
probability that it will appreciate further, and therefore the Swiss franc will appreciate less than is given by the
fundamentals alone. Our model suggests that it would be beneficial for exchange rate policy intentions to be stated
clearly to reduce misinterpretation, in order to anchor exchange rate expectations and reduce exchange rate volatility.
However, transparency about foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate policy may also have adverse effects,
which would need to be weighed against the potential benefits of transparency about exchange rate policy and
intervention implied by our model. Moreover, there may be uncertainty and misperceptions about fundamentals, which
are not modelled here.
We also study how exchange rate dynamics can be characterized in models in which financial markets are aware of
occasional changes in the policy regime. We show that expected changes in the central bank’s exchange rate policy
may lead to exchange rate oscillations, providing an additional source of exchange rate volatility. To capture this effect,
it is important to take into account the possibility of regime changes in exchange rate policy. The ability of the
univariate Markov-switching model to generate non-trivial connections between the dynamics of the exchange rate in
both regimes represents a promising feature and opens the door to study the link between exchange rate uncertainty
and real activity in a multivariate setting.
It is clear that target zone regimes vary from one country to another and within countries over time. Our extension of
the original Krugman model is, therefore, only one example of how such a regime might work. Exchange rate
economics is an exceptionally exciting subject. We hope that the model presented above can contribute to it. 
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 Appendix A: Derivation of Equations (20) and (21) for  and
We need to solve equations (17) and (19) which are coupled with parameters from both states. It is obvious that the
solutions to equation (19) in the text can be obtained as follows:
where
We guess that the general solution for  has the following form
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where , , , , and  are unkonwn variables to be determined, and parameter  follows equation (A2).
Substituting equations (A1) and (A3) back into equation (17) in the main text yields
Rearranging yields
Equation (A5) holds when we have the following relationships for  and 
where
Substituting (A6) - (A8) into (A5), we obtain
We need some relationships between  and  to make equation (A9) solvable. Substituting  back into
equation (A9) gives the following relationship between   and :
Therefore, the solution for  is
This completes the proof.
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Appendix B: Derivation of Solutionsto Equations (17) and (18) for 
We need to solve equations (17) and (18) in the main text which are coupled with parameters from both states for the
regime . We guess that the general solution is of the form
Note that the Markov-switching setting has no impact on the linear part of (B1) and (B2). Thus we have
or simply
.
It is relatively straightforward to show that
This in turn implies that the solutions of  depend on the characteristic equation
As the central bank only intervenes at the informal floor, we need to have two negative roots of the above characteristic
equation, say , where  and  are both positive. Substituting and into the solutions for  and 
 yields
where the unknowns  and  satisfy
or
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where  and  are two negative roots of the characteristic equation
Expanding yields
In order to solve fully for the exchange rate dynamics, it is necessary to apply a number of familiar value matching and
smooth pasting conditions, which apply at the points where the exchange rate touches the edges of the bands. The
usual conditions are modified to allow for there being two states of the world. The conditions observed by market
participants are:
where  is obtained from the results of equations (23) - (26) at  in the main text.
FIGURES
Figure 1: EUR/CHF exchange rate, daily data from 1 January 2010 to 31 August 2016
Source: Bloomberg.
Figure 2: Weekly SNB intervention proxy: Weekly changes in total sight deposits in Swiss francs at the SNB, in
CHF million
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Sources: SNB, Bloomberg, authors’ calculations.
Figure 3: Monthly Intervention Proxies, February 2015-June 2016, in USD million
Notes: Plotted are monthly changes in foreign currency reserves and estimated intervention (estimated as changes in foreign
currency reserves adjusted for valuation changes). Sources: SNB, Bloomberg, BIS calculations.
Figure 4: Informal Lower Band Target Zone Model
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Note:  measures the risk parameter and  measures the lower band in the model.
Figure 5: The Regime-Dependent Dynamics of the EUR/CHF Exchange Rate
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Note: In the graphs is assumed throughout,  measure the lower band for state 0 and  measure the lower band for
state 1. Further benchmark values are , , respectively;
Figure 6: The Dynamics of the Exchange Rate for Different Jump Probabilities
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Note:  measures the probability of state 1 jumping to state 0,  denotes the probability of state 0 jumping to state 1,  measure
the lower band for state 0 and  measure the lower band for state 1.
[1]
 The Swiss franc briefly appreciated to around 1.04 against the euro in early August 2011 (with a low of 1.036 on 10 August
2011, using daily closing prices from Bloomberg, see Figure 1), as the euro area sovereign debt crisis intensified in the second half
of 2011. This intensification seems to have been related to concerns about banks’ possible losses on sovereign debt holdings, and
to an increasing recognition that in any future crisis, banks’ bondholders, and perhaps even wholesale depositors, would not be
bailed out by governments. Euro area banks’ CDS spreads widened following the European Council’s statement of 21 July 2011
referring to a ‘voluntary contribution’ from the private sector to covering the financing gap of Greece (see Allen & Moessner,
2013; Moessner & Allen, 2013). 
[2]
 Since the exit from the minimum exchange rate, it seems that the SNB has focused not just on the EUR/CHF exchange rate, but
on the ‘overall currency situation’ (see SNB, 2016). This is consistent with our modelling approach: if the central bank targets a
basket with unknown currency weights, this would still imply some distribution for the exchange rate band for each bilateral
currency pair. 
[3]
 Halting a further appreciation of the Swiss franc is not an end in itself, but a means to affect inflation, which is the SNB’s main
objective. If inflation is too low, depreciation can lead to higher imported inflation, and thereby to a better attainment of the
inflation objective. Inflation well below target requires monetary policy easing, but with the policy rate at zero and quantitative
easing not feasible due to small domestic financial markets, FX interventions and the currency floor took centre stage for
preventing a further tightening of monetary conditions.
[4]
 One exception was following Brexit. Ahead of the referendum of 23 June whether the United Kingdom should leave the
European Union (Brexit), some economists expected that the SNB would intervene in the foreign exchange market if necessary to
defend a level of the EUR/CHF exchange rate of 1.07, see “Economists expect that he [Jordan] would vehemently defend a euro-
Swiss franc exchange rate level of 1.07” (Neue Züricher Zeitung, 19 June 2016).
[5]
 As mentioned above, affecting the value of the Swiss franc is not an end in itself, but a means to affect inflation, which is the
SNB’s main objective.
[6]
 See Ranaldo and Rossi (2010) for a study on the effects of the SNB’s communication in the form of monetary policy
announcements, speeches and interviews on asset prices.
[7]
 Transparent rule-based FX intervention has sometimes been used to indicate that changes in FX reserves will be limited and
predictable and that there is no explicit intention of exchange rate targeting (eg in Chile and Colombia before and after the global
financial crisis) (Domanski et al., 2016).
[8]
 Commentators have also often referred to this. For example, Handelsblatt (2015) wrote that changes in sight deposits are an
indicator of whether and in what amount the SNB intervenes in order to counter too strong an appreciation of the Swiss franc.
Another article on Bloomberg mentioned that “Sight deposits are the cash commercial banks hold with the central bank and serve
as a proxy measure for interventions. In the past, when the SNB defended its currency ceiling, the deposits were credited with the
amount of francs sold” (Bloomberg, 2015). Obstfeld (1983) analysed the effectiveness of sterilized and nonsterilized interventions
in a rational expectations model. The model covers, amongst other topics, structural equations for German sight deposits’ demand
and supply.
[9]
 In addition to observing the proxy measure of weekly sight deposits, FX market participants may also be able to infer
information on possible FX interventions in real time to some extent by following news reports on platforms like Bloomberg and
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Reuters, which might point to the possibility of or speculation about intervention.
[10]
 The valuation adjustment nets out currencyvaluation changes and estimated interest income gains, and includes variation of
net forward positions. It accounts for changes in the exchange rates of global reserve currencies and the average foreign exchange
reserve composition based on the IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database,
assuming that the share in each currency is remunerated at a Libor rate, following Domanski et al. (2016). The adjustment is not
exact, however, since it is based on information on currency composition of foreign currency reserves which is not updated each
month.
[11]
 However, Adler and Tovar (2011) highlight that differences between changes in reserves and actual intervention at lower-
than-weekly frequencies tend to be minor.
[12]
 Some papers have endogenised exchange rate policy by deriving the width of the band as a rational choice of an optimising
central bank. For example, Cukierman, Kiguel, and Leiderman (1994) model the choice of the bandwidth as a choice between
flexibility in responding to external shocks and commitment of less devaluation and inflation. Such normative issues are beyond
the scope of the paper.
[13]
See Encyclopedia of Mathematics, “Wiener process”, available at http://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php?
title=Wiener_process&oldid=26975 (accessed 2 January 2017).
[14]
 In mathematical terms, the smooth pastingcondition only guarantees a zero slope at . For  the slope is non-zero.
[15]
 Note that this is not necessarily the case in a multilateral band system. For example, Serrat (2000) has shown that in such an
exchange rate setting, exchange rate volatility can be larger than under a free float.
[16]
 We are well aware of the stylised nature of the model, despite our attempts to calibrate with realistic parameters. We do not
claim empirical accuracy for the model but use it rather for qualitative features and predictions.
[17]
 Given such discontinuities, a number of attempts have been made to relax the assumption of a given band and perfect
credibility. An alternative to our modelling approach with oscillating bandwidths over time has been presented by Dibeh (2006). In
his modelling approach, the periodic motion is forced by a sinusoidal function.
[18]
 It is clear that target zone regimes vary from one country to another and within countries over time. Our extension of the
original Krugman model is, therefore, really only one example of how such a Markov-switching regime might work, but it can be
modified and extended in various ways.
[19]
 Regime-switching models are well-established models in the exchange rate literature. Hamilton (1990), Engel (1994), and
Cheung and Erlandsson  (2005) have popularized the Markov-switching toolkit in exchange rate economics by showing that the
Markov switching model is a relevant statistical alternative to the classical martingale model for exchange rates.
[20]
 The assumption of constant switching probabilities may appear unlikely. Tristani (1994) and Werner (1995) have presented
targetzone models in which the realignment risk is a positive function of how far the exchange rate is located from the central
parity – the closer the exchange rate is to the boundaries of the target zone, the higher is the realignment probability.   
[21]
 The analysis here is of potentially recurrent switches of the exchange rate regime. More precisely, it allows for the possibility
(but not the necessity) of a greater-than-zero probability of returning to the original state. On the contrary, Miller and Sutherland
(1991) have analysed the implications of a single not-to-be-repeated jump.
[22]
 An important point to bear in mind is that in contrast to the Swiss case considered here, weak currencies might actually
benefit from such cross-regime effects. For example, weak currencies might benefit from the stabilizing effect of the belief that a
regime switch would tighten up monetary policy in the future with some probability. In other words, in this case regime switches
are a stabilizing device.
[23]
 The modelling toolbox developed here may be combined with the framework developed by Bianchi and Melosi (2016) to
characterize the evolution of expectations and uncertainty in general equilibrium models in which agents have to learn the
stochastic properties of regimes. The central insight of Bianchi and Melosi (2016) consists of recognizing that the evolution of
agents’ beliefs can be captured by defining a set of regimes that are characterized by the degree of agents’ pessimism, optimism,
and uncertainty about future equilibrium outcomes.
